Of Empire

IT IS a miserable state of mind, to have few

things to desire, and many things to fear; and

yet that commonly is the case of kings; who, being

at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes

their minds more languishing; and have many rep-

resentations of perils and shadows, which makes

their minds the less clear.  And this is one reason

also, of that effect which the Scripture speaketh of,

That the king's heart is inscrutable.  For multitude

of jealousies, and lack of some predominant de-

sire, that should marshal and put in order all the

rest, maketh any man's heart, hard to find or

sound.  Hence it comes likewise, that princes many

times make themselves desires, and set their hearts

upon toys; sometimes upon a building; sometimes

upon erecting of an order; sometimes upon the ad-

vancing of a person; sometimes upon obtaining

excellency in some art, or feat of the hand; as Nero

for playing on the harp, Domitian for certainty

of the hand with the arrow, Commodus for play-

ing at fence, Caracalla for driving chariots, and

the like.  This seemeth incredible, unto those that

know not the principle, that the mind of man, is

more cheered and refreshed by profiting in small

things, than by standing at a stay, in great.  We see

also that kings that have been fortunate conquer-

ors, in their first years, it being not possible for

them to go forward infinitely, but that they must

have some check, or arrest in their fortunes, turn

in their latter years to be superstitious, and melan-

choly; as did Alexander the Great; Diocletian; and

in our memory, Charles the Fifth; and others: for

he that is used to go forward, and findeth a stop,

falleth out of his own favor, and is not the thing

he was.
 
 

To speak now of the true temper of empire, it is

a thing rare and hard to keep; for both temper, and

distemper, consist of contraries.  But it is one thing,

to mingle contraries, another to interchange them.

The answer of Apollonius to Vespasian, is full of

excellent instruction.  Vespasian asked him, What

was Nero's overthrow? He answered, Nero could

touch and tune the harp well; but in government,

sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, some-

times to let them down too low.  And certain it is,

that nothing destroyeth authority so much, as the

unequal and untimely interchange of power

pressed too far, and relaxed too much.
 
 

This is true, that the wisdom of all these latter

times, in princes' affairs, is rather fine deliveries,

and shiftings of dangers and mischiefs, when they

are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep

them aloof.  But this is but to try masteries with

fortune.  And let men beware, how they neglect

and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared; for no

man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may

come.  The difficulties in princes' business are many

and great; but the greatest difficulty, is often in

their own mind.  For it is common with princes

(saith Tacitus) to will contradictories, Sunt pler-

umque regum voluntates vehementes, et inter se

contrariae.  For it is the solecism of power, to think

to command the end, and yet not to endure the

mean.
 
 

Kings have to deal with their neighbors, their

wives, their children, their prelates or clergy, their

nobles, their second-nobles or gentlemen, their

merchants, their commons, and their men of war;

and from all these arise dangers, if care and cir-

cumspection be not used.
 
 

First for their neighbors; there can no general

rule be given (for occasions are so variable), save

one, which ever holdeth, which is, that princes do

keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do

ever grow so (by increase of territory, by embrac-

ing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they

become more able to annoy them, than they were.

And this is generally the work of standing coun-

sels, to foresee and to hinder it.  During that trium-

virate of kings, King Henry the Eighth of England,

Francis the First King of France, and Charles the

Fifth Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that

none of the three could win a palm of ground, but

the other two would straightways balance it,

either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war;

and would not in any wise take up peace at inter-

est.  And the like was done by that league (which

Guicciardini saith was the security of Italy) made

between Ferdinando King of Naples, Lorenzius

Medici, and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, the one

of Florence, the other of Milan.  Neither is the opin-

ion of some of the Schoolmen, to be received, that a

war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent

injury or provocation.  For there is no question, but

a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be

no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.
 
 

For their wives; there are cruel examples of

them.  Livia is infamed, for the poisoning of her

husband; Roxalana, Solyman's wife, was the

destruction of that renowned prince, Sultan Mus-

tapha, and otherwise troubled his house and suc-

cession; Edward the Second of England, his queen,

had the principal hand in the deposing and mur-

der of her husband.  This kind of danger, is then to

be feared chiefly, when the wives have plots, for

the raising of their own children; or else that they

be advoutresses.
 
 

For their children; the tragedies likewise of

dangers from them, have been many.  And gen-

erally, the entering of fathers into suspicion of

their children, hath been ever unfortunate.  The

destruction of Mustapha (that we named before)

was so fatal to Solyman's line, as the succession of

the Turks, from Solyman until this day, is sus-

pected to be untrue, and of strange blood; for that

Selymus the Second, was thought to be supposi-

tious.  The destruction of Crispus, a young prince of

rare towardness, by Constantinus the Great, his

father, was in like manner fatal to his house; for

both Constantinus and Constance, his sons, died

violent deaths; and Constantius, his other son, did

little better; who died indeed of sickness, but after

that Julianus had taken arms against him.  The de-

struction of Demetrius, son to Philip the Second of

Macedon, turned upon the father, who died of

repentance.  And many like examples there are;

but few or none, where the fathers had good by

such distrust; except it were, where the sons were

up in open arms against them; as was Selymus the

First against Bajazet; and the three sons of Henry

the Second, King of England.
 
 

For their prelates; when they are proud and

great, there is also danger from them; as it was in

the times of Anselmus, and Thomas Becket, Arch-

bishops of Canterbury; who, with their croziers,

did almost try it with the king's sword; and yet

they had to deal with stout and haughty kings,

William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the

Second.  The danger is not from that state, but

where it hath a dependence of foreign authority;

or where the churchmen come in and are elected,

not by the collation of the king, or particular

patrons, but by the people.
 
 

For their nobles; to keep them at a distance, it is

not amiss; but to depress them, may make a king

more absolute, but less safe; and less able to per-

form, any thing that he desires.  I have noted it, in

my History of King Henry the Seventh of Eng-

land, who depressed bis nobility; whereupon it

came to pass, that his times were full of difficulties

and troubles; for the nobility, though they con-

tinued loyal unto him, yet did they not co-operate

with him in his business.  So that in effect, he was

fain to do all things himself.
 
 

For their second-nobles; there is not much dan-

ger from them, being a body dispersed.  They may

sometimes discourse high, but that doth little hurt;

besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher no-

bility, that they grow not too potent; and, lastly,

being the most immediate in authority, with the

common people, they do best temper popular com-

motions.
 
 

For their merchants; they are vena porta; and

if they flourish not, a kingdom may have good

limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish

little.  Taxes and imposts upon them, do seldom

good to the king's revenue; for that that he wins in

the hundred, he leeseth in the shire; the particular

rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading,

rather decreased.
 
 

For their commons; there is little danger from

them, except it be, where they have great and po-

tent heads; or where you meddle with the point of

religion, or their customs, or means of life.
 
 

For their men of war; it is a dangerous state,

where they live and remain in a body, and are

used to donatives; whereof we see examples in the

janizaries, and pretorian bands of Rome; but train-

ings of men, and arming them in several places,

and under several commanders, and without

donatives, are things of defence, and no danger.
 
 

Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause

good or evil times; and which have much venera-

tion, but no rest.  All precepts concerning kings,

are in effect comprehended in those two remem-

brances: memento quod es homo; and memento

quod es Deus, or vice Dei; the one bridleth their

power, and the other their will.